Tactical Analysis: Weder Bremen v. Hertha Berlin

Werder Bremen needs to switch to a three-man back. You have to understand that I abhor the three-man back, typically; however, in the case of Thomas Schaaf’s squad it might be a boon. Schaaf epitomizes the defensive-player turned attack-minded trainer, possibly more than anyone in the history of the sport. One of his tactics is to push his fullback forward as modified wing-backs, which results in one or both moving forward anytime Werder attacks (which is often). This leaves them with two in the back on most occasions, and three if as against Hertha Fritz or Panasen could be bothered to track all the way back.

The basic difference between a WB and a FB is that wing-back sets up shop near the half-way line rather than deeper in his half. It’s a midfield position that requires extreme lung power. It means that a wing-back is required to track-back; whereas a full-back defends and moves forward. It’s a tactical nuance that is preferential to its employer. Unfortunately a wing-back system is better suited to a three-man backfield.

In the case of Werder, its deployment with two centerbacks is why they are 2^nd in the table while having conceded goals at relegation rate. The other problem for Werder is the use of a fullback to do a midfielder’s job, in effect, dilutes the talent pool on the pitch. Fritz is a competent fullback, but he is a midfielder by trade and brings a lot more to the table as such. Panasen is a stopgap for Wome, who is injured. Neither bring as much to the table as one of Schaaf’s strong stable of midfielders, such as Baumann, Borowski, Alberto, Andreasen, Frings, Jensen or Vranjes, when he returns.

The suprising thing from the game against HBS was how trainer Lucien Favre failed to exploit Panasen on the left. Berlin, when afforded the chance, would attack down their left flank, where Frisk was usually ready to track-back. On the other side, when Favre’s men attacked, Panasen was nowhere to be seen and Metsacker was always moving out of position to close the space.

For Werder, why not just swap Wome/Panasen for a centerback to pair with Naldo and Metsacker? This frees up a slot for a midfielder, which should help them dominate the midfield battle even more than they typically do. This puts less stress on the center backs and when Naldo goes left or Per goes right, there are still two central defenders to guard the cross.

On the day, Werder dominated the game. They created chance after chance. During the first half, Hertha’s back line played a dangerous but brilliantly executed game of packing the 18. Werder would make the moves to get through the midfield, but the final pass would find its way to a man marked in the box. For a team that gave up three goals, Hertha played beautiful defense during the first half. In the second, Werder started shooting from distance. These led to some close chances and openings for the forward line that pushed the game’s pace up a gear. Still they couldn’t get the goal.

The turning point came on Hertha’s big mistake of the day. Hertha tried playing an offside trap in their own half. Almeida was freed for a pass into space by Diego. It was a 15-20 yard pass that shows where Werder is most dangerous, playing medium passes on the break. The second goal by Rosenborg was stared by a 20 yard aerial pass. The final goal by Andreasen was on the break and Andreasen was targeted after two medium distance passes, one to open the field and the other to find him in the box.

If Werder were to utilize three at the back, they would invite more attacking from their opponents, which three would handle easier than the two they have now. And this would result in more counter opportunities. In this one move, Werder can stabilize their leaky defense and open the game to their strengths. Potentially this might be the slight shift they need to catch F.C. Bayern.